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Thank you Chairman Warner and members of the Task Force on Government 
Performance for inviting me to speak today. 
 
My name is Michael Greenstone, and I am the 3M Professor of Environmental 
Economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the Director of the Hamilton 
Project, and a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution.  My research focuses on 
estimating the costs and benefits of environmental quality, with a particular emphasis on 
the impacts of government regulation. 
 
I appreciate the opportunity to speak with you today about how we might improve the 
government’s system of regulatory review.  Under all economic circumstances, 
regulatory efficiency and clarity are crucial objectives for the credibility and 
predictability of the government’s role in the marketplace.  However, given the current 
economic climate, it is absolutely essential to design a regulatory structure that protects 
the well-being of our citizens without imposing unnecessary costs on American 
businesses and society as a whole. 
 
We can achieve these objectives without compromising our values in key areas ranging 
from the protection of public health to the supervision of financial markets by ensuring 
that the Executive and Legislative branches have the tools of analysis and measurement 
they need.  The purpose of my testimony is to describe in concrete terms how this can be 
accomplished. 
 
Introduction 
 
American government, at every level, regulates a broad array of social and economic life. 
Regulatory policy determines the air we breathe, the quality of the water we drink, the 
materials we use to construct our homes, the cars we buy, the rules that govern our 
employment contracts, the loans we can take out, the investments we make, and much 
more. Government regulates these activities because in cases of market failures, for 
example, our free market system does not create the necessary incentives for businesses 
and individuals to protect the public good. 
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But, in making decisions about regulations, public officials must choose which areas of 
our lives merit government rules, as well as how stringent those rules should be. 
 
The Clean Air Act is a classic example of a regulation with significant benefits and costs.  
Before its passage in 1970, there were few constraints on businesses that emitted 
pollution as a byproduct of their operations.  The result was poor air quality.  As one 
small example, it was common for white collar workers in Gary, Indiana to bring an extra 
shirt to work because the first would be dirty from the air and unfit for wear by midday.  
Even more importantly, some of my research, as well as research by others, has found 
that the polluted air led to elevated mortality rates that reduced the lifespans of the 
American people.1
 
  Obviously, no business sets out to cause these impacts; but, in trying 
to maximize their profits, it was not in their interest to install expensive pollution 
abatement equipment when their competitors did not.  As a result, they did not act to 
adequately reduce emissions. 
At the same time, the Clean Air Act’s regulations cause firms to alter their production 
processes in ways that raise their costs.  Indeed, some of my recent research finds that an 
important set of Clean Air Act rules has raised polluting industries’ costs of production 
by roughly 2.6%.  This has reduced firms' profits and led to higher prices for consumers.  
Further, it has caused regulated firms to scale back their operations, which led to 
employment losses.2  Although the ultimate effect on the level of jobs in the economy is 
likely minimal, recent research indicates that workers who lose their jobs due to 
regulation often face prolonged periods of unemployment and become reemployed at 
lower wages.3
 
   
The challenge is for regulators to set rules with benefits that exceed their costs.  This 
seems basic, but a weakness in our regulatory system is that we generally do not have the 
information necessary to make these judgments.  This is because the historical approach 
to U.S. regulation is to evaluate these regulations' likely benefits and costs before they are 
enacted.  This is the point when we know the least because the regulations are untested.  
Once a regulation is implemented, it goes on the books and generally stays there 
unexamined for years and in some cases decades.   
 
                                                 
1 Kenneth Chay and Michael Greenstone, “The Impact of Air Pollution on Infant Mortality: 
Evidence from Geographic Variation in Pollution Shocks Induced by a Recession,” Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 2003, 118(3). 
Olivier Deschenes, Michael Greenstone and Joseph Shapiro, “Defending Against Environmental 
Insults: Drugs, Emergencies, Mortality and the NOx Budget Program Emissions Market,” 
Department of Economics, MIT (2011).   
2 Michael Greenstone, “The Impacts of Environmental Regulations on Industrial Activity: 
Evidence from the 1970 and 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments and the Census of Manufacturers.” 
Journal of Political Economy, 2002, 110(6); Michael Greenstone, John A. List and Chad 
Syverson “The Effects of Environmental Regulation on the Competitiveness of U.S. 
Manufacturing,” Department of Economics, MIT (2011). 
3 Reed Walker, “The Transitional Costs of Sectoral Reallocation: Evidence From the Clean Air 
Act and the Workforce,” Department of Economics, Columbia University (2011).   
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President Obama's recent regulatory reform proposal, spelled out in Executive Order 
13563, is a revolutionary step in the right direction.  Specifically, it requires that agencies 
routinely revisit the measurement of costs and benefits of existing regulations and 
identify the least costly ways to achieve a regulation's goals.  I applaud this very 
important first step.  
 
In the remainder of my testimony, I will identify some ways to extend this important 
reform so that our regulatory system consistently produces rules with benefits that exceed 
costs. 
 
I.  Extending Executive Order 13563 
 
There are three reforms that build on Executive Order 13563 and would ultimately make 
the United States’ regulatory policy more effective.  In keeping with the theme of today’s 
hearing, let me note that these reforms are consistent with the United Kingdom’s 
requirement of analyzing regulations’ benefits and costs both before and after their 
implementation. 
 
First, I recommend institutionalizing the retrospective review of economically significant 
rules in a public way so that these reviews are automatic in nature.  In the case of rules 
that are currently in force, this would mean publicly committing to a retrospective 
analysis of each existing rule within a pre-specified period.  This might be 5 or 10 years, 
with the length of time depending on the particulars of the rule and the results of any 
previous reviews.  
 
In the case of new rules, the implementing agency would be required to announce a 
timetable for review with a maximum allowable amount of time, perhaps 5 or 10 years, 
with shorter time periods being preferable.  In addition, the agency would be required to 
pre-specify the expected benefits (e.g., reduced child mortality rates) and costs (e.g., 
reduced business profits) so that the terms of the subsequent review would be known in 
advance.  The agency would also be required to identify how these benefits and costs 
would be measured; this might include the types of data and other information that it 
anticipates being necessary for review.   
 
Second, the agency should commit to undertaking a new rulemaking when the results 
from the retrospective analysis differ from the benefits and costs that were expected prior 
to the rule’s implementation.  As with the retrospective analysis, there should be a time 
limit for conducting the new rulemaking.  In cases where the realized benefits exceed the 
costs by a wider margin than expected, there may be further opportunities to maximize 
net benefits. In cases where the rules are found to be ineffective or unjustified, agencies 
should identify ways to modify the rules or abandon them.  Finally if the original 
expectation of benefits and costs is confirmed by the retrospective analysis, then there 
would not be a need for a new rulemaking. 
 
Third, we need a triggering mechanism to ensure that retrospective evaluations occur and, 
when appropriate, for new rulemakings to be undertaken within the prescribed time 
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periods.  One approach would be for agencies to announce publicly and post on the web 
the deadline for a rule's review and reconsideration.  A stronger and likely preferable 
approach would be for judicial action to compel reviews and rulemaking in the cases 
when an agency has failed to comply with a review timeline or to act upon its results. 
 
II. A CBO for Regulations 
 
There are at least two difficulties with the approach that I have just outlined.  Many 
agencies do not have the staff, expertise, or the resources necessary to undertake these 
reviews.  Further, the process of self-evaluation is challenging for all organizations as it 
requires complete objectivity.  Indeed, history is unkind to organizations that fail to get 
outside reviews of their work.   
 
My recommendation is to establish a new, independent body for regulatory review.  This 
body could be housed within the Legislative Branch, and it could be modeled after the 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) or even become a division within the existing CBO. 
 
As you know, before the CBO was established, only the President had a ready source of 
budgetary and economic data and analysis.  Congress was forced to largely rely on the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for this sort of information.  The CBO was 
invented to level the playing field.  Its analyses allow Congress to consider the economic 
and budgetary implications of new policy ideas.  Crucially, the CBO also helps Congress 
to evaluate the information that it receives from the Executive Branch.4
 
 
The entire budget process has benefited from the role of CBO.  This is a direct result of 
its independence. The budgetary analyses and proposals of all legislators and Executive 
agencies are now created to a higher standard, knowing that they must ultimately stand 
up to scrutiny by the non-partisan CBO.   
 
This system of budgetary review and economic analysis could be a model for a 
reorganization of regulatory review.  Like the CBO, this new organization would reside 
in the Legislative Branch, and it would be founded on non-partisanship and 
independence.  The organization would be charged with conducting independent 
regulatory impact evaluations.  Some of the organization’s activities would be statutory 
in nature – for example, automatic reviews of economically significant regulations – 
while other evaluations could be performed at the request of Congressional committees 
and members.   
 
Such an organization would directly strengthen our regulatory system.  Agency analyses 
would benefit from the scrutiny that they would ultimately receive from this new, 
independent organization.  Further, the results of the retrospective reviews would become 
part of the agencies' automatic assessments of their regulations that I described above.  
                                                 
4 Congressional Budget Office, “CBO Testimony: Statement of Robert D. Reischauer, Director, 
Congressional Budget Office, before the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress” 
(1993). http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/105xx/doc10580/1993_06_10_mission.pdf 
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And I believe that providing this type of rigorous, independent review would build 
confidence within the business community and a better sense of transparency.   
 
Finally, this new organization could help to increase the credibility of the regulatory 
evaluations by developing an explicit checklist to determine the rigor of regulatory 
analyses.  The checklist should favor randomized control trials that are the gold standard 
in terms of evidence and natural experiments over models and observational studies.  A 
recent Hamilton Project paper provides some other ideas for a check list.5
 
  Such a 
checklist could also be issued as guidance by the Administration to its agencies. 
Of course, the creation of such a body would require resources, which are difficult to 
come by in our current fiscal environment.  However, I think it is extraordinarily likely 
that such an office would pay for itself many times over.  To put this in context, the 
current CBO budget is less than $50 million annually.  My best estimate is that the new 
budget for such an organization would be less, perhaps substantially so.   
 
This is a very small amount of money when compared to the costs that regulations 
impose on our economy.  Although it is difficult to determine the total number of 
economically significant regulations that are on the books, the Office of Management and 
Budget reviewed 540 major regulations between 2001 and 2010.6
 
  These are generally 
economically significant regulations which have an effect of more than $100 million on 
the economy annually—either in costs or benefits.  Consequently, it seems safe to 
conclude that the total costs of regulations can be measured in the hundreds of billions of 
dollars annually.  It is apparent that we have a lot at stake economically with regard to 
our regulatory system and the cost of finding out which parts are working could be quite 
small in comparison.  
In the United Kingdom, they have established an independent committee of experts, the 
Regulatory Policy Committee, to review the evidence and analysis on each regulation and 
to provide an opinion about the robustness of the evidence.  Thus, in many respects, this 
proposal is similar in spirit to what already exists in the U.K. 
 
By creating a body that can undertake rigorous analysis about the costs and benefits of 
regulation – both ex-ante and ex-post – policymakers will have better tools for protecting 
those regulations with great benefits for our society, reforming those regulation that 
impose unnecessary costs, and potentially culling those that no longer serve their 
purpose.   
 
IV. Conclusions 
 
                                                 
5 Ted Gayer, "A Better Approach to Environmental Regulation: Getting the Costs and Benefits 
Right," Discussion Paper 2011-06, The Hamilton Project, Brookings Institution (2011).   
6 Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget, “2011 Report 
to Congress on the Benefits and Costs of Federal Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, 
Local, and Tribal Entities” (2011).   
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In conclusion, our regulatory system is a linchpin of our well-being.  It allows us to live 
longer and healthier lives, among many other important impacts.  However, these 
important benefits come with direct economic costs.  The purpose of my testimony has 
been to identify some reforms that will help to ensure that our regulatory system does its 
job in the most cost-effective way possible – in which the benefits to society exceed the 
costs. 
 
To quickly summarize, I propose two key reforms: 
 
1. Institutionalize a process by which agencies automatically undertake retrospective 
reviews of regulations and initiate a new rulemaking when the results from the 
retrospective analysis differ from the expected benefits and costs. 
 
2. Create a new, independent body for rigorous, objective regulatory review that is 
modeled on the Congressional Budget Office.   
 
Both of these reforms are similar to the successful reform of the U.K. regulatory system 
that is the topic of today’s hearing.  Thus, the U.K.’s experience bolsters the case for 
these reforms.   
 
We live in a rapidly changing economy and need a regulatory review structure that 
evolves to meet the new and different needs of our society.  The reforms that I have 
outlined here will allow our regulatory system to consistently produce rules with benefits 
that exceed costs.  That would be good for our well-being, and good for the American 
economy.   
 
Thank you once again for inviting me to participate in this discussion. I will gladly 
respond to any questions.           
 
